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BLEEDING HEARTS AND PEELING FLOORS : 
COMPENSATION FOR ECONOMIC LOSS 
AT THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
DAVID COHENt 
The decision of the House of Lords in Junior Books Ltd. v .  Veitchi 
Ltd? represents an un\vmanted development in the law of tort and 
contract, unless its rationale and limitations are fully appreciated. 
This reform in such an important area is premature "in the absence 
of hard data on the probable impact of such an extensionJy2 of liabil- 
ity. Much of the published commentary on recovery of economic loss 
in to$ and on this decision in particular, has been written from 
the ex post perspective of accident compensation doctrine and 
theory. Most writers have been concerned with the development of 
positive rules of law designed to provide compensation and redress 
$ Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia 
@ David Cohen, 1984. 
1 [1982] 3 ALL E.R. 201, [1982] 3 W.L.R. 477. I will refer to the case as junior Books, and all citations will be to the W.L.R. This decision is sup- 
ported by recent Canadian cases which arrive at  a similar result. See Gold 
et al. v. DeHauilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd. (1983) 25 C.C.L.T. 180, at 
188 (B.C.S.C.). Cf. Soursos and Soursos v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Com- 
merce et al. [1983] 3 W.W.R. 716 (B.C.S.C.) ; Hofstrand Farms Ltd. v. The 
Queen in Right of British Columbia and B.D.C. Ltd. (1982) 131 D.L.R. 
(3rd) 464, [1982] 2 W.W.R. 492 (B.C.C.A.). 
Junior Books has already been the subject of academic comment. See 
S. Waddams, Tort Liability for Economic Loss: junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi 
Co. Ltd. (1983-84) 8 CAN. BUS. L.J. lor;  J. Holyoak, Tort and Contract 
After junior Books (1983) gg L.Q. REV. 590. 
2 1 Ontario Law Reform Commission, REPORT ON THE SALE OF GOODS 
(19791, a t  243- 
3 The more important articles on recovery of economic loss in tort to which 
the reader is referred include J. A. Smillie, Negligence and Economic Loss 
(1982) 32 U. OF T. L.J. 231; R. E. Speidel, Products Liability, Economic 
Loss and the U.C.C. (1973) 40 TENN. L. REV. 309; P. F. Cane, Physical 
Loss, Economic Loss and Products Liability (1979) 95 L.Q. REV. I 17; P. S. 
Atiyah, Negligence and Economic Loss (1967) 83 L.Q. REV. 248; L. L. 
Stevens, Negligent Acts Causing Pure Financial Loss: Policy Factors at Work 
(1973) 23 U. OF T. L.J. 431. Other leading articles are cited in later foot- 
notes. 
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to an individual who alleges a loss or injury to his economic inter- 
ests. This paper takes a different approach, and examines the larger 
social and economic issues. I t  is important to articulate private legal 
mles and policies (developed incrementally in contract and tort 
claims, or more dramatically in regulatory agendas) insofar as they 
encourage or prevent individual choice to be exercised in decisions 
to assume risks to economic interests. Junior Books is simply an 
incremental development in the evolution of legal rules which 
may restrict choice, and which provide individuals with protection 
against the occurrence of an expanding universe of risks. Whether 
that is desirable depends on one's view of distributive justice, indi- 
vidual autonomy and efficient allocation of risk? 
The facts in Junior Books have been set out by Professor Smith 
in the past volume of this Review: and I will describe them only 
briefly. The defendant9 were flooring specialists who in the fall of 
I 969 and the spring of 1970, laid the flooring in the production area 
of a factory under construction for the plaintiff owners. The flooring 
was a magnesium oxychloride wmposition which was laid on a con- 
crete base.7 The defendants carried out the work pursuant to a 
contract with Ogdvie (Builders) Ltd., the main contractors. Ogilvie 
(Builders) Ltd., who were not parties to the litigation, had wn- 
tracted with the owners to build the factory. The terms of this con- 
struction contract were not considered by the judges and thus the 
contractual performance obligations of the main contractors, and 
any relevant exclusion clauses, were not subject to analysis.8 It is 
accepted that there was no element of risk of physical injury or of 
4 The House of Lords does not agree. I t  seemed, at  least to Lord Roskill, that 
the decision was to be made as a matter of principle rather than policy: 
Junior Books, supra, note I, a t  488. He thus refused to consider the adminis- 
trative and social costs of permitting such claims. For an analysis of the 
principle/policy distinction see R. Dworkin, Hard Cases (1975) 88 HARV. 
L. REV. I 057; D. Horowik, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY ( 1977), at  34. 
5 J. C. Smith, Economic Loss and the Common Law Marriage of Contracts 
and Torts (1984) 18 U.B.C. L. REV. 95. 
6 The case was in the House of Lords on appeal from the Second Division of 
the Court of Session of Scotland. I have chosen not to use the Scottish legal 
terminology of defenders, pursuers, delict, interlocut, condescendence, and 
averments, in the interests of readers who may not be thoroughly familiar 
with the terminology. 
The Scottish law of delict and the English law of negligence are not 
materially different on the issues discussed in the case. Junior Books, supra, 
note I, per Lord Roskill, at  486. 
7 Id., at  480. 
8 Id. This omission, while it was referred to in the judgments of Lord Roskill 
at  495, and of Lord Fraser at  483, is of critical importance in determining 
what is meant by "defective" flooring. See injra at  text accompanying note 93. 
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property damage, or any economic loss other than that which re- 
lated to the replacement of the flooring.' 
Some time in 1972, the plaintiff discovered that the flooring was 
lifting from its concrete base. The explanation for the separation 
of the magnesium oxychloride compound from the base was vari- 
ously attributed ,to ,the proportion of the chemicals and water used 
in producing the solution, and to ,the nature of the floor lay- 
ing activities of the defendantlo The plaintiff sought to recover 
£206,00o representing: the cost of replacing the floor (£50,000) ,ll 
book storage costs (£I ,000) , machinery relocation expenses (£2 ,- 
ooo) , lost profits on the temporary closing of the factory ( £ ~ ~ , o o o ) ,  
contractual liability to employees ( £go,ooo) , overhead (2 I 6,000) 
and investigation costs associated with the flooring replacement 
(23,ooo) .I2 
The House of Lords decidedu that the plaintiff could in theory 
recover compensation for all these kinds of losses in an action in 
tort. There was no requirement that the economic losses be linked 
to actual or potential personal injury, to actual or potential damage 
to other property of the plaintiff, or even to an accident to the 
property distributed to the plaintiff. The compensable economic 
injury was associated only with a "quality" attribute of the product 
manufactured by the defendant, and with associated economic 
losses. The decision is directly contrary to all authoritative Cana- 
dian decisions on point which, for a variety of reasons, have denied 
recovery in such cases.'* Traditional (and exceedingly enigmatic) 
9 I t  is important to note that the issue is one of risk rather than loss. As I 
point out later, the limitation on recovery is based on the absence of risk 
rather than losses related to personal injuries or property damage. 
10 Since the case was decided on an interlocutory motion, the nature of the 
defendant's activities and whether they constituted negligence were.not at 
issue. 
11 Lord Keith, however, articulated this loss to represent a reduction in profits 
associated with the defendant's negligence rather than a loss related to a 
diminution in the value of the floor. See Junior Books, supra, note I, at 485. 
1 2  A strong argument can be made that the plaintiffs, if allowed to recover for 
all of these losses, would certainly be over-compensated. See Sunnyside Green- 
houses Ltd. v. Golden West See& Ltd. (1972) 27 D.L.R. (gd) 434 (ALTA. 
S.C. APP. D.), afPd (1973) 33 D.L.R. (3d) 384 (S.C.C.) ; N. Biger and A. S. 
Rosen, A Framework for the Assessment of Business Damages for Breach of 
Contract (1981) 5 CAN. BUS. L.J. 302, a t  308-26. 
13 Supra, note I, with Lord Brandon of Oakbrook dissenting, at 496. 
14 See Ital-Canadian Investments Ltd. v. North Shore Plumbing and Heating 
Co. et al. 119781 4 W.W.R. 289 (B.C.S.C.) ; Rivtow Marine Ltd. v .  Wash- 
ington Iron Works et al. [1974] S.C.R. 1189, 40 D.L.R. (3d) 530, 119731 
6 W.W.R. 692. 
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decisions describe the inability of an individual to recover economic 
lasses in tort as a result of the losses being too remote,15 or not being 
causally related to the allegedly tortious act?" Other equally ab- 
struse decisions state that no duty of care is owed in such circum- 
stance~.'~ A more functional analysis articulated by some judges and 
commentators regards the purpose of ,tort law as the promotion of 
safety. This thesis holds that a reduction in the value of an article 
which is "safe but shoddy" is not reco~erable.~~ A related rationale, 
commonly expressed in American case law, is that economic loss 
associated with "loss of bargain" is appropriately dealt with by 
contract law?' Clearly, the decision in Junior Books requires a re- 
consideration of all of these limitations on recovery. 
For the purposes of this comment, and in light of the facts in 
Junior Books itself, I will consider the issue of recovery of economic 
loss in tort in the context of a product manufactured by a remote 
manufacturer, who distributes the good to an intermediate supplier, 
who then distributes the good to a buyer. The first contract, between 
the remote manufacturer and intermediate supplier, will be referred 
to as the wholesale contract. The second contract, between the 
intermediate supplier and the buyer, I will refer to as the retail con- 
tract. I will assume, as was the case in Junior Books, that the buyer 
alleges that the product does not function in accordance with his 
expectations and that he has suffered the following financial losses : 
15 See S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v .  W .  J.  Whittal d Son Ltd. 119711 
r Q.B. 337, at 344 (C.A.) ; A. Linden, CANADIAN TORT LAW (3rd ed. 1982), 
at 441; Yumerovski et al. v .  Dani (1978) 18 O.R. (nd) 704 (ONT. CO. 
CT.) ; Weiner v. Zoratti (1970) r I D.L.R. (3d) 598 (MAN. Q.B.) ; Gypsum 
Carrier Inc. v.  The Queen (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 175 (F.C.T.D.), at 
187-94; Trappa Holdings Ltd. v. Dktrict of Surrey (1979) 95 D.L.R. (3d) 
I 07 (B.C.S.C.) . 
16 MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. v. Foundation Co. bf Canada Ltd. (1977) 75 D.L.R. 
(gd) 294, [1g77] 2 W.W.R. 717 (B.C.S.C.). 
17 Dutton u. Bognor Regk Urban District Council [1g72] I Q.B. 373, at 414 
(C.A.); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v .  St. Lawrence Seaway Authority et al. 
[1978] I F.C. 464, 79 D.L.R. (3d) 522 (F.C.T.D.) ; Spartan Steel d Alloys 
Ltd. v. Martin d Co. (Contractors) Ltd. [1g73] Q.B. 27 (C.A.). 
18 J. G. Fleming, THE LAW OF TORTS (6th ed. 1983)~ at 476. Ital-Canadian 
Investments Ltd. v .  North Shore Plumbing and Heating Co. Ltd., supra, 
note 14; Thomas et al. v. Whitehouse (1979) 95 D.L.R. (3d) 762, at 767 
(N.B.S.C., APP. D.) ; Young d Marten Ltd. v. McManus Childs Ltd. 119691 
I A.C. 454, a t  469 (H.L.) ; Nielson et al. v .  City of Kamloops (1981) 129 
D.L.R. (3d) I r I (B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal to Supreme Court of Canada 
granted, 41 N.R. 538. S. Schwartz, Jurisprudential Developments in Manu- 
facturers' Liability for Defective Products when the only Damage is Eco- 
nomic Loss (1979-80) 4 CAN. BUS. L.J. 164, at 177. 
19 P. F. Cane, supra, note 3, at 130. 
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a) a loss representing the difference between the retail contract 
price and the value of the product he expected to receive; 
b) a loss representing the difference between the retail contract 
price and the market value of the defective goods; 
c) a loss representing the cost of repairing the object. The repair 
costs are limited either by the contract price or the expected 
value of the good; 
d) a loss representing expenses incurred by the buyer which are 
wasted as a result of the malfunctioning product; 
e) a loss representing expenses incurred by the buyer which would 
not have been necessary if the good had functioned in accor- 
dance with the buyer's expectations; 
f) a loss representing a financial gain (other than those in (a) ) 
which was not achieved as a result of the malfunctioning; and 
g) a loss representing consequential financial liability to third parties 
caused by the malfunction. 
Junior Books, on its face, suggests that all of these losses are now 
recoverable in 
Junior Books is only one of a number of tools which have been 
used by the courts, or .which have been adopted by regulators, to 
shift economic risks from one individual (the buyer) to another 
(the remote supplier) when we think it appropriate to do so." 
First, there are collateral contracts, based on remote supplier repre- 
sentations, which in the case of  direct'^ relationships can shift all 
economic risks described above to the remote ~upplier.'~ It is, of 
course, much more difficult to persuade the courts to shift these 
risks in the context of general advertising programs where the parties 
are not dealing directly with one another. Second, the courts have 
"0 However, Lord Keith specifically denied recovery for losses representing a 
diminution in the value of the good distributed. 
2 1  Although in some cases the courts suggest that the legislature ought to take 
this decision. See Attorney-General for Ontario v. Fatehi et al. (1981) 34 
O.R. (2d) 129, 18 C.C.L.T. 97 (ONT. C.A.). 
n See Shanklin Pier Ltd. v. Detel Products Ltd. [1g51] 2 K.B. 854; Wells 
(Merstham) Ltd. v. Buckland Sand and Silica Ltd. [1965] 2 Q.B.  170; 
Murray v. Sperry Rand Corp. et al. (1979) 96 D.L.R. (3d) 113, 23 O.R. 
(2d) 456 (ONT. H.C.). The requirement of a direct relationship was ex- 
plicitly recognized in Lambert et al. v. Lewis et al. [1g7g] R.T.R. 61, a t  
93-94; rev'd in part [1g80] 2 W.L.R. 299, at 327 (C.A.). The decision 
was varied on appeal, [1g81] I Am.. E.R. I 185 (H.L.). 
Of course, where the issue is compensation for physical injuries, the scope 
of the collateral contract doctrine might be expected to be much broader and 
thus may not require the direct relationship. See Leitz v. Saskatoon Drug 
and Stationary Co. and T.C. Distributors (1970) Ltd. (No. 2)  (1980) 4 
SASK. L.R. 35 (SASK. Q.B.). 
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used the negligent misrepresentation doctrine as an economic risk- 
shifting tool.23 In these decisions, again limited to cases where the 
remote supplier is in a direct relationship with the buyer, the courts 
impose liability for economic losses where the risk is ccvoluntarily 
accepted or ~ndertaken".~~ Third, where the direct relationship is 
contractual in nature, the courts will shift these economic risks under 
the guise of implied tams of merchantability and fitness for pur- 
pose.25 Finally, civilian doctrine has been developed at the Supreme 
Court of Canada which, drawing from principles developed in 
French lawYz6 establishes a continuing or transferable warranty flow- 
ing from manufacturers to ultimate  consumer^.^ Under this floating 
warranty doctrine, a buyer in Quebec can recover pure economic 
losses from a remote supplier. Indeed, the remote supplier cannot 
by contract limit the liability associated with the application of this 
legal warranty. There is little doubt that the decision was as signifi- 
cant to the civil law as Junior Books is to the common law.z8 
These common law and civilian developments are themselves 
simply an aspect of a much broader program of legislative reform 
directed to the same end. Proposed consumer warranty and sales 
23 E.g., Herrington et al. v .  Kenco Mortgage B Investments Ltd. et al. (1981) 
125 D.L.R. (3d) 377 (B.C.S.C.) (negligent misrepresentation of value of 
property secured by mortgage influencing decisions of purchaser of mortgage 
from mortgage broker); McBean v.  Bank of Nova Scotia et al. (1981) 15 
B.L.R. 296 (ONT. H.C.) (negligent advice of bank as to economic risks of 
investment decision). 
" Hedley Byrne B Co. v. Heller B Partners Ltd. Ex9643 A.C. 465; 119633 2 
ALL E.R. 575 (H.L.), per Lord Devlin, at  529. 
25 The similarity between recovery of economic loss in tort and the implication 
of implied terms in a contractual setting was noted by several members of the 
Court in Junior Books, supra, note I. See Lord Brandon at  499, Lord Roskill 
at  495- 
26 See D. Tebbens, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCT LIABILITY (1g7g), at  97; B. S. 
Markesinis, The Not So Dissimilar Tort and Delict (1977) 93 L.Q. REV. 78, 
at  101. 
27 General Motors Products of Canada Ltd. v .  Kravitz [1g7g] I S.C.R. 790, 
93 D.L.R. (3d) 481. The Supreme Court decision anticipated proposed 
revisions to the Civil Code which imposed direct warranty obligations on 
manufacturers, and the enactment oP the Quebec Consumer Protection Act, 
S.Q. 1978 c. g, s. 53. Both would seem to extend protection for pure eco- 
nomic loss to buyers. See Quebec Civil Code Revision Office, I REPORT ON 
THE QUEBEC CIVIL CODE (1977); Draft Civil Code, Book Five, OBLIGA- 
TIONS, S. 102. 
28 An entire issue of the MCGILL LAW JOURNAL was devoted to the w e .  
(1980) 25 MCGILL L.J. 296. S. Schwartz, The Manufacturers' Liability to 
a Purchaser of a "Lemon": A Review of the Situation in Canada After 
General Motors Products of Canada Ltd. v .  Krauitz (1979) I I OTTAWA 
L. REV. 583. 
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legislation in Ontario,29 proposed sales reform in Alberta,"" the Uni- 
form Sale of Goods Act recently proposed by the Uniform Law 
Conference of Canada:' and consumer protection legislation cur- 
rently in force in New BrunswidP will permit recovery of pure 
economic loss against remote suppliers in various contexts. In  addi- 
tion Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Prince Edward Island and Alberta 
have for several decades permitted buyers of farm implements to 
recover economic losses from remote suppliers under a floating war- 
ranty theory.33 
This sales and warranty legislative reform, which reflects attitudes 
similar to those evident in Junior Books, is complemented by trade 
practice legislation34 which provides for recovery of economic losses 
from remote suppliers in cases of ,disappointed consumer expecta- 
tions associated both with positive acts of misrepresentation and 
with "conduct" and non-disclosure of information which leads to 
disappointed e~pectations.9~ It could be argued that the introduction 
of products into the marketplace may create reasonable expectations 
of product quality? and that privity of contract is not a prerequisite 
to recovery under trade practice legi~lation.~~ 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, REPORT ON CONSUMER WARRANTIES AND 
GUARANTEES IN THE SALE OF GOODS (1972)~ at  71. Cf. sujra, note 2, a t  
243-55. 
30 Institute of Law kesearch and Reform, Report No. 38, THE UNIFORW SALE 
OF GOODS ACT {1982), a t  I 15-27. 
31 PROCEEDINGS OF THE Sm-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE UNIFORM 
LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA (1981)~ Appendix gb at  185-321; Section 
5.18 of the Uniform Sale of Goods Act. 
32 Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. C-18.1, ss. 
23 and 2. 
33 Farm Implement Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. F-4; The Agricultural Implements 
Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. A-10; Farm Machinery and Equipment Act, S.M. 1971, 
c. 83; Farm Implements Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1974, c. F-3. 
34 See Business Practices Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 55; Trade Practices Act, S. Nfld. 
1978, c. 10; Business Practices Act, S.P.E.I. 1977, c. 31; Unfair Trade 
Practices Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33; Trade Practice Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 406; 
Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1978, c. g. 
35 Id.: British Columbia, ss. 3 (I)  (a), 3 (3) (4) ; Ontario, s. 2 (a) (xiii) ; Alberta, 
s. 4(1) (i); Newfoundland, s. 5(1). See G. Q. Taperell, TRADE PRACTICES 
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION (and ed. 1978)~ at  494; A. K. Turner, 
ESTOPPEL BY REPRESENTATION (3rd ed. 1977), a t  46-47; Bodger v. Nicholls 
(1873) 28 L.T. (N.S.) 441 (Q.B.); Mullet v. Mason (1866) I L.R.C.P. 
559; C.R.F. Holdings Ltd. et al. u. Fundy Chemical International Ltd. et al. 
(1982) 19 C.C.L.T. 263 (B.C.C.A.). 
38 B. J. Reiter, Contracts, Torts, Relations and Reliance, Study 8 in J. Swan 
and B. J. Reiter (eds.), STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (1980)~ at  307. 
37 Sujra, note 34. Both Alberta and British Columbia have apparently abolished 
the privity doctrine in the context of the distribution of goods by commercial 
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This expansion of liability for economic losses, reflected in the 
evolution of common law contract and tort doctrine, in civil law, 
and in sales and trade practice legislative reform, has not met with 
universal approval. The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable 
to Products Ligbility of I 972 specifically excludes recovery for pure 
economic 1 0 s . ~  As well, the English Law Commission in its Report 
on Liability for Defective Products recommended against the appli- 
cation of strict liability to economic losses.39 In Canada, the Sas- 
katchewan Consumer Products Warranties Act,m whiie it extends 
implied warranty protection to remote users, limits recovery to cases 
of personal injury. American developments in tort and contract 
demonstrate a similar ambivalence towards this issue, although the 
majority of states have adopted rules denying recovery of some if 
not a l l  kinds of pure economic loss. The American Restatement41 
requires as a prerequisite to recovery in a strict product liability 
action that the product be "unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property", thus precluding recovery for losses 
related only to quality or performance inadequacies." American 
courts, although they are not unanimous, limit strict products liabii- 
ity recovery to damages to person or pr~perty.'~ Similarly, most 
-- - -- 
enterprises: British Columbia, s. I, definition of supplier; Alberta, s. I (h). 
The Ontario legislation only provides for remedies against persons who make 
the offending consumer representations. Thus in Ontario, the potential de- 
fendants are limited to those suppliers who "make" a representation, state- 
ment, offer, request or proposal relating to consumer goods or services (s. 
4(3) ) ; the same would seem to be true of Prince Edward Island (s. 4(2) ). 
While the privity restriction would seem to be implicitly avoided in On- 
tario, it would still seem to be necessary to demonstrate that a particular 
supplier engaged in positive information dissemination activities with respect 
to the product in question. The mere supply of a consumer good to an inter- 
mediate supplier would appear to be insufficient In Newfoundland (s. 2 (g) ) 
the term "supplier" is defined to include non-direct suppliers who "offer or 
advertise" the sale of consumer goods to a consumer. Again it would seem 
to be necessary to demonstrate that the "supplier" engaged in information 
dissemination. 
38 Supra, note 26, a t  341-42. The Convention is set out in Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, REPORT ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY ( 1g7g), a t  165. 
39 Law Commission, REPORT NO. 8 2  (1g77), at  35. 
40 R.S.S. 1980, C. C-30, S. 5. The rationale for thii limitation is dicussed in 
L. J. Romero, The Consumer Products Warranties Act (1978-79) 43 SASK. 
L. REV. 81, at  189-92. 
41 American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
(1965) s. 402A. See Comments g, h, i. 
42 W. Kimble and R. 0. Lesher, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1g7g), at  79-80; Tex- 
sun Feed Yards Inc. u. Raiston Purina Co. 447 F.nd 660 (5th Cm. I 97 I) .  
43 See Seely v. White Motor Co. 403 P.2d 145 (CAL. SUP. CT. 1965) at  150-51; 
Morrow u. New Moon Homes, Inc. 548 P.2d 279 (ALASKA SUP. CT. 1976) ; 
Heinonline - -  18 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 296 1984 
1 984 ECONOMIC LOSS 297 
American courts have denied recovery in negligence for economic 
losses.M As well, recovery against remote suppliers under implied 
warranty doctrines of the Uniform Commercial Code has not been 
extended to pure economic loss. The vast majority of states has 
adopted a formulation of Article 2-3 I 8 of the Code which limits 
buyer recovery to personal injuries. Only three states extend recov- 
ery to pure economic loss.45 
Junior Books, as a common law decision, must be evaluated in 
light of this array of common law and legislative reform. Its signifi- 
cance should not be underestimated, as it clearly demonstrates a 
judicial attitude which favours expansion of tort recovery. The 
paradigm which I set out earlierM implicitly acknowledges that the 
focus of my attention is on ithe activities or processes which occur 
before the loss which the plaintiff is asking the court to shift to the 
defendant. This ex ante approach to Junior Books looks at k k s  of 
economic loss, and assesses judicial decisions which signal actors 
that they must take into account the p&biity that others may be 
less well off (or worse off) as a result of their activities. This view 
reflects my concern that the legal rules we choose will influence be- 
haviour, so that we must assess recovery of economic loss from the 
perspective of decision-making in situations where the relevant ac- 
tors are aware of the future uncertain probability of accidents and 
damage valuation. The result of this analysis is not always the same 
as that obtained through the "traditional ex post approach to legal 
scholar~hip".'~ 
Iowa Electric Light B Power Co. v .  Allk Chalmers Mfg. Co. 360 F. SUPP. 
25 (1973); Avenell et al. v .  Westinghouse Electric Corp. 324 N.E.2d 583 
(OHIO CT. APP. 1974) ; Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v. Shivers et al. 557 
S.W.2d 77 ( T E ~ s  SUP. CT. 1977)~ at  79. See generally, P. Sherman, PROD- 
UCTS LIABILITY (1981)~ at  287-90; J. E. Beasley, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT (198 I ), at  639-44. 
The minority view is reflected in such decisions as Russell v. Ford Motor 
Co. 575 P.2d 1383 (OR. SUP. CT. 1978) ; John R.  Dudley Construction Inc. 
v. Drott Mfg. Co. 66 A.D.2d 368 (N.Y.A.D. 1979); Santor v.  A. B M. 
Karaghuesian Inc. 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. SUP. CT. 1965). 
" W. P. Keeton, D. G. Owen and J. E. Montgomery, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND 
SAFETY (1980)~ at  932-33; Chrysler Corp. v. Taylor 234 S.E.2d 123 (GA. 
CT. OF APP. 1977); Clark v. International Harvester Co. 581 P.rd 784 
(IDAHO SUP. CT. 1978). Compare Berg v. General Motors Corp. 555 P.2d 
818 (WASH. SUP. CT. 1976). 
45 J. Honnold, THE LAW OF SALES AND SALES FINANCINO (4th ed. 1976), a t  
149-51- 
46 See text supra, following note 19. 
47 C. G. Veljanovski, The Economic Theory of Tort Liability - Toward a Cor- 
rective Justice Approach, Ch. 5 in P. Burrow and C. G. Veljanovski, THE 
Eco~onnc APPROACH TO LAW (1g81), at I 28. 
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I t  is my view that this ex ante approach has several advantages 
in the evaluation of recovery of economic losses in tort. First, it ex- 
plains cases in which what the court describes as economic loss has 
been recovered, ,but in which the activity at issue created a risk of 
damage to property,* or a risk of physical injury or loss of life.49 
Second, when one conceptualizes the activity as the creation of a 
risk of physical injury or property damage (rather than analyzing 
the ex post situation of the plaintiff), it makes perfect sense that 
cceconornic loss" incurred to eliminate a risk of personal injury or 
property damage is treated in the same fashion as the injury or 
damage itself, and thus is recoverable in tort.50 Third, the ex ante 
allocation of risk analysis avoids ,the result selective and analytically 
bankrupt doctrinal distinction between property damage to the 
product sold or ,distributed (which represents a non-compensable 
loss) and property damage to other property (which is compen- 
sable) .51 The distinction, while appealing at a superficial level, is 
subject to a considerable degree of judicial manipulation permitting 
recovery where the court, for unexpressed reasons, considers it ap- 
p r ~ p r i a t e . ~ ~  Fourth, this risk analysis meets the argument that it is 
artificial to develop different rules for property damage and eco- 
nomic loss, since it is "often accidental whether a defective product 
causes one type of loss, or another, or both".53 Finally, this ap- 
proach explains the distinction between permitting recovery of the 
* See John R .  Dudley Construction Inc. v. Drott Mfg. Co., supra, note 43; 
Morrison Steamship Co. v. Greystoke Castle (Cargo Owners) [1947] A.C. 
265 (H.L.). 
49 Lambert v .  Lewis, supra, note 22. In that case the Court of Appeal was of 
the view that the "economic loss" of a retailer, incurred through hi con- 
tractual liability to a customer which resulted from the death of members 
of the plaintiffs family, was not recoverable in a tort action brought by the 
retailer against a remote manufacturer. The House of Lords, however, indi- 
cated that this economic loss might very well be recoverable. [1981] I ALL 
E.R. I 185, at I 192. 
50 Riutow Marine Ltd. v .  Washington Iron Works, supra, note 14, a t  551 ; Anns 
v. Merton London Borough Council 119783 A.C. 728 (H.L.) per Lord Wi- 
berforce, at 760; Batty and Another v. Metropolitan Property Realizations 
Ltd. [1978] Q.B. 554, [1978] 2 W.L.R. 500 (C.A.). 
5 1  See J. G. Fleming, supra, note 18, at 166-67; P. F. Cane, supra, note 3; 
Ital-Canadian Investments Ltd. v .  North Shore Plumbing and Heating Co. 
Ltd., supra, note 14. 
52 Riutow Marine Ltd. v .  Washington Iron Works, supra, note 14, per Ritchie 
J., at S.C.R. 1207, D.L.R. 542; Chabot v. Ford Motor Company of Canada 
Ltd. et al. ( I 982) 138 D.L.R. (3d) 41 7, at 447 (ONT. H.C.) ; Trans World 
Airlines Inc. v .  Curtiss-Wright Corp. 148 N.Y.S.2d 284 (N.Y. SUP. CT. 
19551, a t  290. 
53 Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 2, a t  246. 
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cost of replacing or repairing an article which is "defectiveyy in that 
it presents a risk of an accident "of violence or collision with ex- 
ternal obje~ts",5~ and disallowing recovery of repair or replacement 
costs associated with quality defects evidenced by internal deteriora- 
tion or breakd~wn."~ The criterion is the type of risk not the type of 
loss.5s It is the potential danger which justifies recovery, since it is 
the potential (marginal) cost which a remote supplier must assess 
in determining (marginal) investments in accident avoidance and 
reduction measures. 
If one accepts that an understanding of the recovery of economic 
loss in tort can be gained through an analysis of the allocation of 
risks between non-contracting parties, a further step must be taken 
to differentiate among the kinds of economic risks to which the re- 
mote supplier might have directed its attention. Direct economic 
risks include first, the risk that the product is not as valuable as the 
price which the buyer paid; and second, the risk that the product 
is not as valuable as that which the buyer expected to receive.58 Obvi- 
Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v .  Caterpillar Tractor Co. 652 F a d  1165 
(3rd CR. 1981), a t  I 170; Fuller v. Ford Motor Company of Canada Ltd. 
(1978) 94 D.L.R. (3d) 127,22 O.R. (2d) 764 (ONT. CO. CT.). 
55 Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp v.  Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, note 54; 
W .  Prosser, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971)~ at  665. 
56 Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, note 54, 
a t  I 172; Northern Power d En'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Corp. 623 
P.2d 324 (ALASKA SUP. CT. 1981), a t  329. 
I admit that the l i e  may not be easy to draw in some cases. See Industrial 
Uniform Rental Company v.  International Harvester Co. 61 PHILA. 141 
(C. P. PHILA. 1981), discussed in C. C. Fallon, Physical Injury and Economic 
Loss-the Fine Line of Distinction Made Clearer (1981-82) 27 VILLANOVA 
L. REV. 483, a t  498. A similar phenomenon is apparent in the case of 
"ineffective" drugs. The drug does not pose a risk to health or safety in the 
sense that i t  "causes" injury, and thus may be viewed as creating only an 
economic risk. At the same time the user may, in choosing an ineffective 
drug, fail to use an effective product and thus expose himself to a risk to 
personal safety or health. 
57 See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence (1966) 66 
Co~uar. L. REV. 917. My definition is somewhat different than that set out 
in the note. See also Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchas- 
ers for 'Economic Loss'' Damages Tort or Contract? (1966) 1x4 U .  PA. 
L. REV. 539, a t  541. 
" Recovery of this "loss of bargain" or disappointed expectation has consistently 
been denied in tort actions: Doyle v .  Olby (Ironmongers) Ltd. [1969] 2 
Q.B. 158, [1969] 2 ALL E.R. I 19 (C.A.) ; Morin Technical Services (1978) 
Ltd. v. Morin et al. (1982) 20 B.L.R. 191, a t  213-15 (ALTA. Q.B.) . Beaver 
Lumber Co. Ltd. v. McLenaghan et al. (1983) 143 D.L.R. (3d) 139, at 
148-49 (SASK. C.A.) . 
However, in Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Mardon [1976] Q.B. 801, 119763 
2 ALL E.R. 5, [1976] 2 W.L.R. 583 (C.A.), Lord Denning permitted recov- 
ery bf an "alternate opportunity cost" representing the foregone profits avail- 
able or an alternative investment which would have been made had the tort 
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ously there is considerable overlap between these two sub-categories 
of economic risks. It is not clear which is discussed in Junior Books. 
In many cases these risks can be re-articulated as the risk that the 
buyer will incur expenses to repair or replace the good so that the 
buyer possesses a good with a market value equivalent either to the 
contract price or to the buyer's expected value.59 These risks are, at 
least in their formulation, clearly related to the contractual concepts 
of merchantability and reasonable fitness for purpose, a similarity 
that was acknowledged by the House of  lord^.^' Until Junior Books, 
the risk of direct economic losses resulting from "qualitative de- 
fects7'pl and of disappointed expectations of value associated with 
activities which present no risk of property damage or physical in- 
jury, have been allocated, as between a remote supplier and a buyer, 
to the buyer both in contracte2 and in tort.63 
In addition to these risks of direct economic loss, tort law has also 
had to assign the risk of consequential financial losses either to the 
remote supplier or buyer. This consequential economic risk may be 
further broken into two subsidiary elements. First, either the remote 
supplier or the buyer must take into account the risk that the buyer 
may incur expenses which would not otherwise be required if the 
not been committed. See also Woolridge v. H. B. Nickerson B Sons, Ltd. et 
al. (1980) 40 N.S.R. (2d) 388, a t  404-07 and at  444-45 (N.S.S.C. APP. 
D.), afYg (1980) 39 N.S.R. (2d) 45 (N.S.S.C.) ; Ross v. Caunters [1980] 
I CH. 297, a t  321 (CH. D.). 
59 Note, supra, note 57, at 918; S. Waddams, PRODUCTS LIABILI~  (2nd ed. 
1g80), a t  32; P. F. Cane, supra, note 3, at 130. 
60 See Iunior Books, supra, note I, per Lord Keith, a t  485 and per Lord Roskill, 
at 495. 
61 R. M. Wattson and D. E. Bland, Economic Loss: A Subrogated Insurer's Kiss 
of Death (1983) 18 FORUM 649, at 650. 
62 In contract law the doctrine of privity of contract precludes recovery. See 
Fraser-Bruce Maritimes Ltd. v.  Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation 
(1981) 117 D.L.R. (3d) 312 (N.S.S.C. APP. D.) ; Greenwood Shopping 
Plaza Ltd. v.  Beattie et al. [1g80] 2 S.C.R. 228, I I I D.L.R. (3d) 257; 
Sigurdson et al. v. Hillcrest Service Ltd. ( 1977) 73 D.L.R. (3d) 132, [1g77] 
I W.W.R. 740 (SASK. Q.B.). See J. A. Smillie, supra, note 3, at 277. This 
restriction is subject to collateral contract claims which are permitted in 
direct relations. See cases cited supra, note 22. 
63 See cases cited supra, note 14. Thomas et al. v. Whitehouse (1979) 95 
D.L.R. (3d) 762 (N.B.S.C.). But see Western Processing and Cold Storage 
Ltd. et al. v. Hamilton Construction Co. Ltd. et al. (1965) 51 D.L.R. (nd) 
245 (MAN. C.A.). 
Of course, if the remote supplier and buyer are dealing directly with each 
other in a planned activity, the court may award costs of repairs on Hedley 
Byrne principles. See cases cited supra, note 23. See also Robert Simpson 
Co. Ltd. et al. v .  Foundation Co. of Canada Ltd. et al. (1982) 36 O.R. 
(2d) 97, at I 13-14 (ONT. C.A.). 
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product accords with his expectati~ns.~ Second, either the remote 
supplier or buyer must take into account athat the buyer may not 
be able .to generate revenue or profits to the same degree as he 
could have had the product performed as expected.=. Again the 
generally accepted view is that consequential economic loss is not 
recoverable in tort against remote suppliersPG Junior Books clearly 
and unequivocally establishes that, in principle, both kinds of direct 
economic risks and both kinds of consequential economic risks6? will, 
at least in a limited set of cases, be assigned to the remote manu- 
f a c t ~ r e r . ~  
It is my view that, on balance, the decision in Junior Books is an 
undesirable development in the law. As I explain, the decision might 
be supportable if limited to the allocation of catastrophic consequen- 
tial economic risks to direct non-contractual suppliers in non-com- 
mercial settings where loss-spreading and consumer misperception 
of quality provide persuasive arguments for recovery. At the same 
time I believe, for several reasons, that it is inappropriate in most 
cases to assign the risk of direct and consequential economic losses 
to remote suppliers. 
Firsty the benefits associated with the internalization of these costs 
to the manufacturing process must be evaluated in light of the costs 
of the loss-shifting mechanism, which in this case include the in- 
creased social and private costs of judicial administration of such 
claims. It is difficult to understand the view of the House of Lords 
that the social costs engendered through the establishment of the 
~4 These expenses may themselves be further described as out of pocket ex- 
penses, and liability to third parties associated with the malfunctioning or 
inadequate product: W. Prosser, supra, note 55, a t  665-67. 
See Note, supra, note 57; S. Waddams, supra, note 59, a t  35. For the pur- 
poses of this discussion, consequential economic loss will refer to any financial 
liability or expectation which is incurred or frustrated as a result of the 
supply of a product, except direct economic loss. The range of possible con- 
sequential economic losses is infinite. See S. Waddams, id., generally. 
GG See cases cited supra, note 14, and S.C.M. (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W. J .  
Whittal 6' Son, supra, note 15, a t  344. But see Maughan et al. v. Interna- 
tional Harvester Co. of Canada Ltd. (1980) I 12 D.L.R. (3d) 243, a t  249 
(N.S.S.C. APP. D.). 
However, if the buyer articulates his claim as a negligent failure to warn, 
consequential economic losses related to the untimeIiness of the warning or 
to the failure to warn in general may be recoverable. See Rivtow Marine 
Ltd. v. Washington Iron Works, supra, note 14; Labrecque v. Saskatchewan 
Wheat Pool (1977) 78 D.L.R. (3d) 289 (SASK. Q.B.). 
67 It is clear, in addition, that expectation interests represented by future profits 
were considered compensable entitlements. See Junior Books, supra, note I, 
a t  480. 
Supra, note I I. 
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right to compensation must be ignored by legal decision-makers, 
The "floodgates" argument is neither specious nor doctrinaire as 
Lord Roskill so bluntly put it."' Given limited judicial resources, the 
allocation of some part of those resources to the shifting of eco- 
nomic losses from one individual to another must mean that those 
resources will not be available for other purposes. The trade-off is 
inevitable, and in assessing the desirability of using ,the courts to 
resolve disputes relating to economic risks, we must identify the 
foregone opportunities which such a decision entails.7o Shifting losses 
is a social activity which has its own costs and should not be under- 
taken unless one can demonstrate a net social gain." 
A second rationale for denying recovery of economic losses is re- 
lated to this concern with litigation costs. Some commentators have 
expressed the view that legal rules should be developed so as to 
channel economic losses through one party when an activity pre- 
sents risks to numerous potential  plaintiff^.'^ Where the economic 
losses are likely to be relatively small (as in the case of direct eco- 
nomic losses), and possibly widespread, and where the loss-shifting 
litigation costs are high, social welfare may be maximized by deny- 
ing recovery for economic losses by buyers against remote suppliers. 
This denial of recovery will result, where contracting costs are rela- 
tively low, in the channelling of the economic losses to the inter- 
mediate supplier.73 Buyers, since they are in direct contractual re- 
lationships with their intermediate suppliers, can at a low marginal 
transaction cost either shift the risk to the intermediate suppliers, or 
assume the risk in exchange for a price red~ction.~" If these arrange- 
ments can occur (and in the factual paradigm I have presented this 
is likely to be the case), the ex Post loss-shifting mechanism between 
69 Junior Books, supra, note I ,  at 494, citing Cooke J., in Bowen v. Paramount 
Builders (Hamilton) Ltd. [I9771 I N.Z.L.R. 394, at 394 and 422. Compare 
Robins Dry Dock B Repair Co. v .  Flint et al. 275 U.S. 303 (1927) ; Electro- 
chrome Ltd.  v. Welsh Plastics Ltd. 119681 2 ALL E.R. 205 (ASSIZES). 
70 See D. N. Dewees, J. R. S. Prichard, M. J. Trebilcock, CLASS A C ~ O N S  A  
A REGULATORY INSTRUMENT ( I 980). 
7 1  S. Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law 
of Torts (1980) g J .  OF LEG. STUD. 463. 
72 M. J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts (1982) I I 
J. OF LEG. STUD. 281, at 283-84. Rizzo develops this thesis in the context of 
channeling losses through one person who has suffered personal injury or 
property damage, but there seems to be no reason to limit the argument to 
that case. 
73 Id.  
7 4  Where he has assumed the risk, recovery should also be denied. See infra, 
at text accompanying notes 93 and 100. 
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buyers and remote supliers can be replaced by these channelling 
contracts. The courts have on several occasions expressly endorsed 
this rationale and have held that remote suppliers should not be 
responsible for losses from which the buyers could have protected 
themselves under an intermediate contract at a low marginal c0st.7~ 
Channelling costs are obviously low in the products liability context, 
and expected litigation costs will certainly exceed them. If chan- 
nelling contracts are desirable (and I demonstrate later that this is 
likely -to be so), ,then denial of recovery for economic losses is pre- 
ferred if it produces a tendency for these channelling terms to 
emerge. 
A third rationale for the denial of recovery of economic losses 
looks at the positive benefits which the alleged tort creates. Put 
simply, while the alleged negligence may result in a private cost to 
the plaintiff, it will in many case. also result in a benefit to an 
unknown third party whose resources will now be allocated to pro- 
duce the economic benefits which the plaintiff can no longer enjoy. 
The lost revenue of the plaintiff will be offset to some degree by 
revenue generated by a competing firm or firms who will enter the 
market in substitution for the plaintiff. What appears to be a net 
social loss will in many cases simply represent a transfer payment 
from one individual to an0ther.7~ If that is true, and it will be at 
least to some degree, ex post loss-shifting may not be desirable, since 
net social welfare has not been reduced in any way by the apparent 
injury. In  fact, if negligently inflicted economic losses (and thus 
benefits) are randomly distributed, then in the long term an indi- 
vidual's apparent economic injury associated with one negligent act 
may be offset by the quite invisible economic benefits which he may 
enjoy due to to another negligent act?' Thus the administrative 
costs of loss-shifting may not be necessary. Alternatively, if the law 
permits recovery of economic losses, it should perhaps equally oblige 
the beneficiaries (whoever they are) to compensate tortfeasers for 
these positive externalities. The latter solution would clearly impose 
78 See Byrd v. English 43 S.E. 419 (SUP. CT. OF GEORGIA 1903), at 420; 
Robins Dry Dock €3 Repair Co. v. Flint, supra, note 69. Deap Sea Tankers 
Ltd. v. S.S. Tricape [1g58] S.C.R. 585, 16 D.L.R. (rd) 600. 
76 W. Bishop, Economic Loss in Tort (1982) 2 OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. I, 
at 3 and 14-17. But see supra, note 72, at 286-88. 
77 A simiiar point has been made in the context of governmental decisions 
affecting economic welfare. See M. J. Trebilcock and J. Quinn, Compensa- 
tion, Transition Costs, and Regulatory Change (1982) 32 U.  OF T. L.J. 1x7, 
at 160. 
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substantial administrative costs, if it were possible at all, and in 
the end it may be better to leave the economic losses (and gains) 
where they fall. 
A fourth rationale for denying recovery of economic lossa (i-e., 
for refusing .to sanction ex ante shifting of economic risks) is that 
contrary to the view of ,the House of Lords:' economic losses are 
not the same as personal injury and property damage. Where con- 
sequential losses relate to personal injury or to damage to property, 
one function of tort law is to provide mandatory insurance to prod- 
uct users in respect of these kinds of risks.Tg It is quite possible to 
argue that our concern with loss-spreading through the establish- 
ment of this "safety netHs0 and our apparent social attitudes that 
health and safety risks (and care) should not be allocated through 
the market are concerns and attitudes which do not apply to finan- 
cial losses. Where personal injury and property damage occur, we 
create almost unlimited private law compensatory rules, identical 
for all intents and purposes in contract and ,tort."' Economic risks 
are, however, qualitatively and categorically distinct from risks of 
personal injury and property damage. 
Some writers have suggested that we intuitively view injury to 
one's person as more significant than injury to one's economic 
status.= And a review of the history of social welfare legislation 
suggests that social planners, in allocating resources to social insur- 
ance, have consistently emphasized insurance for personal injuries 
78 See Junior Books, supra, note I, per Lord Roskill, a t  490-91. 
79 G. Calabresi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); J. A. Smiilie, supra, note 
3, at 234-35. F. Harper and F. James, THE LAW OF TORTS (1956), a t  
759-84. 
s o  That is not to say that we ignore individual economic catastrophes, but 
simply that we do not perceive them nor treat them in the same way as we 
do individual personal injury. 
81 H. Parsons (Livestock) Ltd. v. Uttley Ingham d Co. 119781 I Q.B. 791 
(C.A.) (contrasting personal injury, property damage and ensuing expense, 
with lost profits). See H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honor&, CAUSATION IN LAW 
(1959), at 281-87. Asamera Oil Corp. Ltd. v .  Sea Oil d General Corpora- 
tion: Bund Corp. N.V. v. Brook [1g7g] I S.C.R. 633, 89 D.L.R. (3d) I. 
See C. Coval, J. C. Smith and J. Rush, "Out of the Maze": Towards a 
"Clear Understandinp" of  the Test for Remoteness of  Damaees in Neelipence 
" - "  (1983) 61 CAN. BAR-RE~. 559, at'575. 
The distinction has been recognized in the United States. See Posttape 
Associates v. Eastman Kodak Co. 537 F.rd 75 I (3rd CIR. I g76), Pennsylvania 
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., supra, note 54. Cf. Caltex Oil 
(Aust.) Pty. Ltd. v. The Dredge ccWillemstad" (1976) 136 C.L.R. 529 (AUST. 
-- n , 
H.G.). 
82 See R. Hayes, The Duty of Care and Liability for Purely Economic Loss 
(1979) 12 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 79, at 80-81. See E. Weinrib, The 
Case for a Duty to Rescue (1980) go YALE L.J. 247, at 286-87. 
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and property damage over pure economic losses.83 For reasons which 
space does not permit me to canvass here, we have decided that 
health care benefits should be allocated by non-market (non-con- 
tractual) social institutions84 It would be inconsistent to allocate 
health benefits and health risks in different ways. Thus tort law 
recovery has obvious application to personal injury claims, while 
the uninsured distribution of economic risks is left to the market. 
In addition, personal injury and property damage (and indeed 
out-of-pocket expenses) represent a movement from a position of 
wealth to a position of less wealth on &e part of the plaintiff. This 
actual loss, compensable in tort:5 must be contrasted with .the lost 
opportunity of obtaining economic benefits. Recently, commentators 
have suggested that the value one places on what one hopes or ex- 
pects to obtain (i.e., the expressed willingness to pay for 'a good) 
is consistently and demonstrably less than the value one places on 
what one has (i.e., one's asking price for an "owned" good) .86 The 
injury represented by an unrealized economic opportunity may not 
be perceived to be as serious as personal injury, property damage, 
or injury to existing wealthy and thus the demand for legal recog- 
nition is attenuated. The entitlement represented by "expectation 
of economic gain", while recognized in contract:' may have been 
quite rightly recognized (if recognized at  all) as a weak interest in 
tort law reflecting the view that the socid costs of loss-shifting may 
be substantial and that the perceived private costs of the accident 
are low. 
83 See D. Guest, THE EXERGENCE OF SOCIAL SECURITY IN CANADA (1980)~ 
at 98-100. Workers Compensation legislation exemplifies this attitude: see 
Ch. 4. 
84 See B. M. Dickens, The Control of Living Body Materials (1977) 27 U.  OF 
T. L.J. 142, a t  167-68. 
8s See Dominion Tape of Canada Ltd. v .  L .  R .  McDonald B Sons Ltd. et al. 
[1g71] 3 O.R. 627 (ONT. CO. CT.). But see the comments of Wilson J.A., in 
Attorney-General for Ontario v .  Fatehi, supra, note 21, a t  C.C.L.T. I 15, I 17. 
86 D. K e ~ e d y ,  Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlements Problems: A Critique 
(1981) 33 STAN. L. REV. 387; S. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production 
Theory and Ideology in the Coase Theorem (1979) 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 
669; D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision 
Under Risk (1979) 47 ECONO~~TRICA 263; D. H. Gjerdingen, The Coase 
Theorem and the Psychology of Common-Law Thought (1983) 56 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 71 I, a t  753. 
87 J. G. Fleming, supra, note 18, a t  166, 476. 
88 But even here the recognition has been described as counter-intuitive. As 
well, the rationale for contract recognition of expectation interests may ex- 
tend beyond the redress of actual injury to the facilitation of economic 
planning. See L. L. Fuller and W. R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in 
Contract Damages (1936) 46 YALE L.J. 52, a t  57. 
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The fifth and perhaps most persuasive argument against recovery 
of economic losses in tort relates to ,the relative ability of the remote 
manufacturer and buyer to acquire knowledge of the risk of eco- 
nomic losses and to take appropriate accident prevention measures.89 
Empirical evidence9' supports the intuitive view that consequential 
economic risks are knowable, controllable, and insurableg1 at a lower 
marginal cost by ultimate users than by remote manufacturers?' 
This point deserves to be investigated closely. In providing recovery 
for economic losses in the products Gabiity context one is obliged 
(in deciding to compensate "losses") to first determine the injured 
party's reference point, namely the non-injured state to which the 
law will return her. In product liability cases this reference point can 
only be determined, as Lord Roskill reco@ed,93 by assessing the 
buyer's contractual expectation. In many cases it will be the buyer 
who will be in the better position to know what that means. I will 
ignore the obvious doctrinal difficulties raised by decisions which 
suggest that the liability of the remote manufacturer in tort can be 
defined or affected by the terms of the contract between the buyer 
and intermediate s u ~ p l i e r . ~  If the buyer is in a better position to 
69 See D. Riley, CONSEQUENTIAL LOSS INSURANCE AND CLAIMS (4th ed. 1977). 
90 G. L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer Product Warranty (1981) go YALE 
L.J. 1297, at  1307-19. 
9 1  The risks may be insurable a t  a lower marginal cost simply because the 
insurer can assess the risk in the case of first party insurance much more 
accurately than in the case of third party "economic product liability" 
insurance. The latter may not even be available. See S. Waddams, supra, 
. . .  
note 59, at  2 I 7-1 g. 
Of course. this mav not alwavs be true. Professional liabilitv insurance 
providing d i rd  party' liability coverage to lawyers, accountanti and other 
information brokers will often provide coverage for economic risks, and i t  
is precisely here that tort law has expanded to provide recovery for pure 
economic loss. See Ross v. Caunters, supra, note 58; N .  Rafferty, The Tor- 
tious Liability of Professionals to their Contractual Clients, in F. N .  Steele 
and S. Rogers-Magnet, eds., ISSUES IN TORT LAW (1981 ), a t  251-56. 
92 See W. Bishop, The Contract-Tort Boundary and the Economics of Insurance 
(1983) 12 J. OF LEG. STUD. 241, at  254. 
93 Supra, note I. Lord Roskill admitted that an exclusion clause in the inter- 
mediate supplier-buyer retail contract "might in some circumstances limit 
the duty of care". See also Lord Fraser of Tullybelton, at  481. 
I t  is interesting to note that the statutory reforms which have been sug- 
gested in this context, usually in sales legislation, adopt a similar view: that 
is, that the "reference point" from which one assesses the plaintiffs injury 
is defined, at  least in part, by reference to all the terms of the immediate 
sales contract, including any exclusion clause, between the ultimate consumer 
and his seller. See Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 2, at 
243-55, and Draft Bill s. 5-18 (3) and s. 5.18 (4). 
94 See Greenwood Shopping Plaza Ltd. v. Beattie, supra, note 62; Canadian 
General Electric Co. Ltd. v. Pickford B Black Ltd. 119711 S.C.R. 41, 14 
D.L.R. (3d) 372. The same point has arisen, for example, in negligent 
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predict the probability and magnitude of the economic risk, to invest 
in preventive measures, and to obtain insurance against residual 
risks, what purpose (other than a simple wealth transfeP5) is served 
by tort rules which shift the loss from the buyer to the remote 
manufacturer? 
It may be true that the remote manufacturer may be in a position 
to produce a good of a "better" quality in some sense of the word. 
In the normal case, however, the remote manufacturer will not 
know what "better" means. The variables which may influence a 
buyer's expectation of value may include product design (in a 
variety of aspect. relating perhaps to component compatibility, regu- 
latory compliance, and sub-contract terms), durability (in a broad 
range of uses and environments), ability to utilize specific raw ma- 
terials, storage requirements, operating environment requirements, 
country of origin, and an infinite range of performance character- 
istics. I t  is impossible even to begin to define "valueyJ. Thus it is 
nonsensical .to attempt to describe the remote manufacturer as hav- 
ing produced a "defective" good in some abstract sense. When the 
remote manufacturer can do little to reduce the magnitude or prob- 
ability of economic risks, the application of Junior Books will simply 
transfer wealth from remote manufacturers to a small subgroup of 
buyers who can persuade the courts that the manufacturer was 
negligent. But that is not the end of the story. 
What will occur if liability for economic risks is shifted to the 
remote manufacturer is that the manufacturer will respond to the 
legal disincentives by taking steps to ameliorate forseeable conse- 
quences of this legal allocation of risk. First, it may attempt to 
obtain third party economic loss insurance. The evidence available 
- ~ 
misrepresentation cases where a contractual exclusion clause between A and 
B may be relied upon by C when sued by A. See Hedley Byrne 6' Co. v. 
Heller 6' Partners Ltd., supra, note 24. 
One explanation for the relative ease with which the House of Lords 
dealt this issue may be that Junior Books is a Scottish case, and these com- 
mon law doctrinal diiculties do not exist in Scots law. Gt. Brit. Law Re- 
vision Committee, SIXTH INTERIM REPORT, STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND THE 
DOCTRINE OF CONSIDERATION ( I  937), a t  25-30. 
95 EconomistS would say that the loss, once i t  has occurred, is a "sunk cost" 
and rationally should be irrelevant in respect of decisions as to the future. 
The transfer of wealth from the remote manufacturer to the buyer simply 
transforms the world from State A in which the buyer is $X poorer, to State 
B in which the remote manufacturer is $X poorer. See P. Burrows and C. G. 
Veljanovski, Introduction: The economic ap$roach to law, Ch. I in P. 
Burrosvs and C. G. Veljanovski (eds.), supra, note 47, at 5. 
The law cannot retrospectively- change the fact that the world is $X 
poorer. 
Heinonline - -  18 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 307 1984 
308 U.B.C. LAW REVIEW VOL. 18:2 
at this time suggests that insurance is not commonly available in 
respect of such risks.96 Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, remote 
manufacturers can take steps to reduce the costs of their activity by 
self-insuringP7 or by taking preventive measures to reduce the prob- 
ability of the accident occurring: in other words, by "improving" 
the quality of its products. 
As I argued above, it is not clear that the marginal cost of acci- 
dent prevention through improved quality is low. Given the range 
of variables which relate to quality, the costs of product improve- 
ment may be quite high. Moreover, if ,the remote manufacturer is 
unable to distinguish between classes of buyers to whom the product 
will be directed, the improved-quality goods, whatever that means, 
must be directed at some hypothetical consumer. The problem is 
that users are apt to value different quality parameters in quite dif- 
ferent ways and certainly to different degrees. Some users may pre- 
fer to pay a lower price for low quality goods; others may be willing 
to pay a higher price for high quality goods. 
If the remote manufacturer determines ,that modification of prod- 
uct quality is not feasible, and perhaps even if some product quality 
alteration takes place, residual risks will be dealt with by insurance. 
Again however, an inability to discriminate among buyers will result 
in inefficiencies. Certainly highly risk-averse consumers will be pur- 
chasing insurance coverage at a lower price than would otherwise be 
the case, since they will, to some degree at least, be subsidized by 
less risk-averse consumers who are purchasing insurance they would 
prefer to do without or at a higher price than they would willingly 
pay. This subsidization is undesirable for at least two reasons. First, 
highly risk-averse consumers will be receiving benefits at below the 
price which they would otherwise be willing to pay (i.e., under a 
direct sales contract or insurance scheme). This represents a fore- 
gone opportunity to the manufacturer which represents one aspect 
of welfare loss. In addition, less risk-averse consumers pay a price 
96 See Heppel, PRODUCTS LIABILITY INSURANCE (1967), Ch. 3; S. Waddams, 
supra, note 59, at 214-18; M. Dewis, D. C. Hutchins and P. Madge, 
PRODUCT LIABILITY ( I  g80), at 156-57; D. Tebbens, supra, note 26, at 13 I.  
See Canadian Equipment Sales d Service Co. v. Continental Insurance Co. 
(1975) g O.R. (2d) 7, 59 D.L.R. (3d) 333 (ONT. C.A.); Hartford Fire 
Ins. Co. v .  Benson d Hedges (Canada) Ltd. (1978) 85 D.L.R. (3d) 467 
(S.C.C.) . 
97 An alternative which may be available only to those enterprises which have 
a large enough class of product buyers to spread the loss through marginal 
pricing decisions. 
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which exceeds the value ,they place on the benefit?' This also repre- 
sents a welfare 10s. It is not clear to me (that we want a legal rule 
which results in those losses, and one cannot ignore the distributive 
consequences of this insurance subsidization program from one 
group of users to another.99 
An evaluation of ,these remote manufacturer responses must also 
recognize the possibity that buyers will be insuring themselves 
against product quality risks. Buyers can do this in a number of 
ways, the most obvious of which is to obtain a contractual obligation 
from their intermediate supplier pursuant to which the intermediate 
supplier assumes responsibiity for economic losses associated with 
defective goods. It is clear that at least some judges and commen- 
tators are aware of this p&b'ity, and thus in determiniig the 
plaintiffs loss in Junior Books would have taken as their reference 
point the contractual expectations of the remote buyer. Once we 
say that the buyer assumes the risk or risks at issue under the inter- 
mediate supplier-buyer contract (the retail contract), we deny him 
recovery against all parties.'OO Where a buyer can be said to have 
m m e d  certain risks under the retail contract, it is because he has 
received a benefit under the exchange relationship (reflected in a 
relative price reduction, an additional non-price benefit, or in a re- 
duction in non-price costs which he would otherwise bear) which he 
values more than the risk he m m e s  under the contraGt. Over a 
number of transactions we can assume that the buyer will consider 
himself to be better off through receiving these immediate trans- 
actional benefits (and assuming the relevant economic risk) than he 
would be by not receiving the benefits and instead being able to sue 
the intermediate supplier for the loss once it occurs. It is efficient for 
the purchaser to assume the risk (as we may assume it is, looking only 
at the tcvo contracting parties)"' and we consider that the risk- 
shifting is .desirableJ we should, in evaluating Junior Books, recog- 
9s See R. Hirshhom, Regulating Quality in Product Markets in D. Dewees 
(ed.), THE REGULATION OF QUALITY (1983), at 76. See also W. Oi, The 
Economics of Product Safety (1973) 4 BELL J. OF ECON. 3. 
99 These distributive consequences may very well be desirable in decisions to 
allocate risks and accident prevention costs relating to personal safety. 
100 One way in which this issue has been analyzed is by stating that the plain- 
t i fE should not be able to recover where he has a contract with a third party 
in which the relevant risk was allocated to him. If recovery is based on 
reliance, one can argue that in such a case the plaintiffs reliance on the 
remote manufacturer's representations or conduct is unreasonable. See B. J. 
Reiter, supra, note 36, at ngo-94. 
101 See R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost (1960) 3 J.  LAW a ECON. I. 
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nize that establishing a right of recovery in tort against a remote 
manufacturer will discourage the contractual risk-shifting.lo2 
It is thii analysis which permits cost-benefit analysts (and indeed 
the House of Lords itself) to state correctly that contractual risk 
allocation to the ultimate purchaser should preclude recovery by 
that purchaser. The function of the law is not to shift that loss to 
the remote manufacturer, for if recovery is permitted the purchaser 
in effect recovers twice: he gets paid to assume the risk, and then 
when the risk occurs he gets paid again! As Mishan argues, the loss 
'"takes its place as one of a number of economic consequences"103 
which the decision-maker faces. The individual's reaction .to the loss 
which occurs, no matter how catastrophic, is irrelevant. "Person A, 
for example, may. . . rue his decision to take the risk. But this is 
only a painful reminder of the fact that people come to regret a 
great many choices ,they make."lo4 Thus recovery of economic losses 
in tort, if it is recognized at all, must be limited, as was intimated 
correctly in Junior Books, to those risls for which the buyer did not 
assume responsibility under its direct contract with her intermediate 
supplier.lo5 Looking at the same issue from another perspective, it 
102 I t  is true that recovery of economic losses will encourage manufacturer 
internalization of social costs and will provide incentives to manufacturers 
to increase investment in product quality. As I suggest, however, i t  is not 
clear that manufacturers will be able to do this effectively. 
As well, even if we think that cost internalization is desirable, allocation 
of economic risks to manufacturers reduces the incentives of both contracting 
parties (the buyer and intermediate supplier) to take measures to reduce the 
risk of accidents and the consequences of accidents which do occur. See 
W. Oi, The Economics of Product Safety, supra, note 98; R. A. Epstein, 
MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (1980), at  41-42. 
This consequence of risk allocation to remote manufacturers may not be 
as serious in the case of personal injury risks as i t  is in the case of economic 
risks if one assumes that consumers may underestimate risks of product safety 
and that intermediate suppliers and consumers normally can do little to 
reduce the potential injuries and property damage associated with product 
use. This is especially true if the risk is borne by non-contracting product 
users, a situation more likely to occur in the case of physical injuries and 
property damage than in the case of economic losses. In  the case of economic 
risks relating to product value, it is quite clear that the exchange transaction 
pennits the buyer and seller to reduce the risk by negotiating its allocation 
by price adjustments and through modification of product description. 
I03 E. J. Mishan, ELEMENTS OF COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2nd ed. 1976), at  
I 04. 
Id., at 108. See also A. D. Twerski, A. S. Weinstein, W. A. Donaher and 
H. R. Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability- 
Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age (1976) 61 CORN. L. REV. 495; 
J. Guss, Product Quality - A  Multidisciplinary Policy Perspective in The 
New Consumer Protection Act of Quebec, MEREDITH MEMORIAL ECTURES 
(19791, at  159. 
105 See S. M. Waddams, supra, note I, a t  104-05. 
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seems plausible to argue that recovery should be denied whenever 
the plaintiff could have made (ex ante) at a relatively low cost an 
appropriate contract to shift economic loss "up streamay so to speak, 
thus reducing the costs of litigation.lo6 
Finally, recovery should be denied when the buyer has assumed 
the risk of loss, since in cases where the risk has been assumed know- 
ingly, the expected accident costs will have been taken into account 
in the price of the good. When the price for the good reflects the 
product's expected cost (including all expected "losses" associated 
with quality defects and consequential expenses) then the apparent 
"external" losses will have been internalized ex ante through a re- 
duction in price. Recovery of economic losses in this case will result 
in internalization twice, and thus an overinvestment in quality and 
accident-reduction measures, and underproduction of the good?07 
What looks like an externality is not?08 When buyers have appro- 
priate information about product economic risks, the expected acci- 
dent losses ~ v i l l  be internalized ex ante, and thus ex post loss-shifting 
is unnecessary.lOg 
I have attempted so far to demonstrate that loss-shifting between 
buyers and remote manufacturers for economic losses wili in many 
cases be unnecessary, may provide buyers with double recovery, will 
reduce incentives both for contractual risk allocation and for alter- 
nate buyer accident reduction measures, may exacerbate subsidiza- 
tion of high-risk buyers by low-risk buyers, and finally may not in 
the end reduce the costs of accidents to any si&cant degree. While 
there may be arguments in favour of recovery in a limited context, 
these arguments support neither the principle nor the result estab- 
lished in Junior Books. 
The primary arguments in favour of recovery of economic losses 
in tort focus on the abiity of the remote manufacturer to control 
this risk ex ante. We must: recognize that there are at least two 
108 M. J. Rizzo, supra, note 72, at 284-85. 
107 S. Star, The Eficiency of Liability Rules in Determining Optional Product 
Quality, in PAPERS AND COMMENTS DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH ANNUAL 
WORKSHOP ON COMAIERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW ( 1 9 8 0 ) ~  at 153. 
10s See C. G. Veljanovski, supra, note 47, at 139-40; H. Demsetz, Wealth Own- 
ership and the Ownership of Rights (1972) I J. OF LEG. STUD. 223. 
I* There may, therefore, be an argument in favour of permitting recovery in 
cases where information imperfections may result in imperfect ex ante bar- 
gains. Where buyers underestimate expected economic losses, tort recovery 
may serve a valuable function in providing remote manufacturers with incen- 
tives to provide information. See C. G. Veljanovski, supra, note 47, at 
139-40. 
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techniques which would allow manufacturers to reduce accidents, 
that is, to control the economic risks which tort law would allocate 
to her. First, as I discussed earlier, the manufacturer can obtain 
insurance against these risks, or self-insure if that is not possible. 
As we have seen, however, this will certainly result in subsidization 
of highly risk-averse buyers by less risk-averse buyers. In fact it is 
logical to assume that high-risk buyers will attempt to select to 
purchase such products, since if ,the remote manufacturer cannot 
effectively distinguish among buyers they will be able to purchase 
protection at a lower marginal cost than they would otherwise be 
willing to pay. This problem of subsidization and adverse selection110 
may be reduced by providing an incentive, as we do in contract 
law, for buyers who face "unusual" economic risks to disclose them 
to their suppliers.'" In contract law the information is disclosed to 
sellers; in tort law this analysis would support mandatory disclosure 
to remote manufacturers in respect of information which is likely 
to be known to buyersF2 thus reducing the distributive conse- 
quences of buyer subsidization and permitting more accurate pric- 
ing.l13 If insurance is the remote manufacturer's response to tort 
risks for economic losses, we should perhaps limit buyersy recovery 
to expected losses which are likely .to be borne by substantial per- 
centages of the buyer population. 
The second possible response of the manufacturer to potential 
tort losses is to redefine his wholesale contract obligations to his 
immediate buyer, the intermediate supplier in my factual paradigm. 
If tort liability to the buyer is premised upon a determination that 
the remote manufacturer has breached his wholesale contract with 
the intermediate supplier, the manufacturer can at a relatively low 
marginal cost ,define and thus control the risks which he is assuming 
in tort to unknown buyersY4 This limiting principle is supported 
by one judgment in Junior Books115 and conforms to the "floating 
110 W .  Bishop, supra, note 92, at 246, 254-55- 
111 This is the classic instrumental rationale for Hadley v. Baxendale (1854)  
g EXCH. 341. See R. Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in  the Indus- 
trialization of the Law (1975)  4 J. OF LEG. STUD. 249; R. Posner, Eco- 
~ o n r ~ c  ANALYSIS OF LAW (2nd ed. 1g77),  at 95. 
112 See K. Swinton, Forseeability: Where Should the Award of Contract Dam- 
ages Cease, supra, note 36, at 70-74. 
113 W .  Bishop, supra, note 92, at 255, 261. 
114 See Institute o f  Law Research and Reform, supra, note 30, at 124-25. 
115 See supra, Note I : Lord Fraser at 482-83 and Waddams at 103-04; Young 
d Marten Ltd. v. &Manus Childs Ltd., supra, note 18, per Lord Reid, at 
469; note, Another Look at the "pure economic loss rule" 119831 Bus. L.J. 
64, at 65. 
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warrantyyy concept which has been adopted in Quebec? and sev- 
eral American jurisdictions,ll7 and which is proposed in Ontario118 
in the context of economic loss recovery by buyers against remote 
manufacturers. This analysis 'has several advantages. First, as I said 
earlier, under this formulation of liability, the remote manufacturer 
can control his risks to a far greater degree than would otherwise 
be the case. Second, ,the investment of judicial resources needed 
to define what we mean by "negligence" in the context of product 
quality risks is reduced ,to an absolute mi.~imum.l'~ 
Yet this accident control technique is far from perfect. First, the 
remote manufacturer who seeks to rely on the terms of the whole- 
sale contract between himself and the intermediate supplier when 
sued in tort by a buyer may face considerable doctrinal difficul- 
ties.lZ0 Second, the remote manufacturer even when defining his 
direct contractual relationship must take into account unknown po- 
tential product users and unknown economic product risks. Thus 
while the "floating warranty" concept does permit a measure of 
remote manufacturer accident control, it still leaves untouched a 
considerable area of risk. This difficulty may, however, be reduced 
significantly if one limits recovery to relatively probable buyer risks 
116 Supra, note 27. 
117 See Article 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
118 Section 5.18 of the Draft Sale of Goods Act proposed by the Ontario Law 
Reform Commission limits a buyer's rights and damage recovery against 
manufacturers to the kinds of risks and liability limitations which the manu- 
facturer assumed with the intermediate party. See Ontario Law Reform 
Commission, supra, note 29. 
"9 Any other definition of negligence would require the courts to decide that 
efficient accident prevention measures could have been, but were not, under- 
taken by the remote manufacturer. Information about the marginal costs 
of accident reduction techniques available to the manufacturer a t  both pre- 
and post-production and distribution phases of his enterprise, about the 
marginal benefit of such activities and about the pre-purchase and post- 
purchase marginal costs of accident reduction activities of the buyer (and 
about the marginal benefits of those activities) is notoriously difficult to 
obtain. See A. I. Ogus, Social Costs in a Private Law Setting (1983) 3 
INT. REV. OF L. AND ECON. 27, a t  35. 
The "negligence as breach of contract" formulation permits us to take 
advantage of the evidence that, as between the remote manufacturer and 
intermediate supplier, the remote manufacturer is the least cost avoider, and 
reduces the judicial resources which would otherwise be necessary to estab- 
lish negligence standards. See Veljanovski, supra, note 47, a t  131; D. N. 
Dewees, G. F. Mathewson, M. J. Trebiicock, Policy Alternatives in Quality 
Regulation, Ch. 2 in D. N. Dewees (ed.), supra, note 98, at 32; Posner, 
supra, note 1 x 1 ,  a t  137; H. Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability 
Matter? (1972) I J. OF LEG. STUD. 13, a t  28. 
1% Since the remote manufacturer is not a party to the contract, he will not 
generally be able to rely on its provisions to limit his legal responsibility in 
tort. See cases supra, note 94. 
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and to economic risks faced by buyers with whom the manufacturer 
deals directly. Finally, the "floating warranty" concept ignores the 
expectations and perhaps reliance of the buyer (whose loss is de- 
fined, as we have seen, ,by the terms of his contract) .la Unless the 
buyer knows the terms of the wholesale contract (as was likely the 
case in Junior Books), this control technique may not in reality 
reduce accident costs. 
A third argument which favours recovery of economic losses looks 
to the nature and consequences of the economic injury. When the 
economic losses are "catastrophic" it may be possible to justify re- 
covery on the ground that society places a value on recovery that is 
significantly higher than the private costs measured by the dollar 
amount of the loss. The benefits to the individual and to others 
from loss-spreading in the case of catastrophic losses may not be 
fully taken into account by the individual buyer who, even where 
he accurately assesses and values the risks, will only take into ac- 
count his personal expected dollar amount of recovery?22 Put an- 
other way, the social benefit associated with recovery in these cases 
increases as the magnitude of the individual loss increases.lZ3 As 
well in these cases, ,the increase in social welfare concomitant to 
recovery may be associated with lower litigation costs?24 Accord- 
ingly, in cases of consequential economic loss of a catastrophic na- 
ture, and perhaps when these economic losses are suffered by indi- 
viduals rather than firms? tort law should permit recovery. This 
policy may explain both the case l agz6  and legislative reform of 
farming equipment transactions which permit recovery against re- 
mote suppliers.lm It may also explain the suggestion of the Ontario 
Law Reform Commission in its Report on Products Liability to per- 
- Junior Books, supra, note I, per Lord Roskill, at 495. 
122 Supra, note 72, at 284. 
Id., at 304. 
124 Id .  
2-25 Where economic losses are suffered in a personal context, the view that the 
injured party will have first party insurance against these losses, and will be 
in a better position to know of and to take preventive measures, which may 
justify non-recovery of consequential economic loss in a business context, is 
unrealistic. Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 38, at 82. P. S. 
Atiyah, ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION A D THE LAW (3rd ed. 1g80), at 
89-9 I .  
lZ6 See cases cited supra, note 23. Cf., Glanzer v. Shepard 135 N.E. 275 
(N.Y.C.A. 1922). 
127 Supra, note 33. 
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mit recovery of economic losses in non-business ~0ntexts. l~ As one 
court put it, "commercial losses often are reflected in personal sor- 
row."- Unfortunately the decision in Junior Books was neither 
limited .to catastrophic losses nor to personal economic injury. 
A fourth argument which favours recovery is that in some limited 
set of cases we might believe that a reduction in consumer choice 
may be desirable. If a particular class of transaction is characterized 
by consumer misperception of quality then the regulatory impact of 
tort recovery may be to remove from the market certain alternatives 
which consumers should not have chosen and would not have 
chosen if they had full knowledge.130 Again, however, Junior Books 
itself is not obviously a case of buyer misperception of quality nor 
does it appear representative of a class of cases where misperception 
might be thought likely. 
A Bth posible argument in favour of recovery of economic loss 
is the avoidance of multiple transaction costs associated with indi- 
vidual insurance. If we believe that protection from a particular 
economic risk is likely to be valued highly by a considerable propor- 
tion of the market, then "mandatory insurance" through tort law 
and concomitant product pricing by remote manufacturers will con- 
stitute a single ,transaction alternative to multiple individual buyer 
protection transactions either through contract or first party insur- 
ance.131 The Court did not address the matter, but it seems unlikely 
that any of the risks encountered in Junior Books are of this type. 
Even where such risks occur, one should keep in mind the subsidiza- 
tion and adverse selection ineffeciencies discussed earlier which are 
the cost of the notional insurance policy established by tort re- 
c0very.1~~ 
Ontario Law Reform Commission, supra, note 38, a t  84, 135. As well, the 
New Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, S.N.B. 1978, 
c. C-18.1 while i t  provides for recovery of pure economic loss, excludes 
recovery of losses suffered in a business capacity. 
L- Momanto Company v. Alden Lee& Inc. 326 A.2d go (1974)~ at  97; R. M. 
Wattson and D. E. Bland, supra, note 61, a t  661; D. W. Noel and J. J. 
Phillips, PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2nd ed. 1982)~ at  293-94. 
130 See R. Hirshhorn, Product Safety Regulation and the Hazardous Products 
Act, ECONOMIC COUNCIL OF CANADA, TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 10, REGU- 
LATION REFERENCE (1981)~ at  g. 
m J. Goldring and A. J. Duggan, Manufacturers' Liability and the Trade 
Practice Act in A. J. Duggan and L. W. Darrell (eds.), CONSUMER PRO- 
TECTION LAW ANJ3 THEORY (1980), a t  72. 
These inefficiencies c;u! be reduced, to a degree, by restricting recovery to 
immediate parties for high probability economic losses. 
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This analysis of the arguments favouring recovery of economic 
losses suggests that Junior Books, if restricted (or perhaps narrowed) 
in its application, may represent a positive step in tort law. My con- 
cern with sthe general application of Junior Books is considerably 
reduced if recovery is limited to cases where the parties are dealing 
"face to face" or as the House of Lords put it, are in a situation 
"falling only just short of a direot contractual relation~hip."'~~ The 
reasons for this critical limitation are incontrovertible. First, recov- 
ery will be permitted only where the remote manufacturer is in a 
position to know of or to acquire information relating to the product 
quality characteristics valued by ,the buyer. This will ensure that 
accident prevention measures directed at the particular buyer will 
be feasible. Second, ,because the parties are dealing directly with 
one another, the marginal transaction costs associated with shifting 
the risk to the buyer where he is the more efficient cost avoider will 
be low. Third, the direct relationship will permit manufacturers to 
control the risks which .they face by providing the specific product 
user with relevant product information: a method of accident re- 
duction which is considered to be the least costly regulatory measure 
available to remedy market dy~function.'~~ 
If Junior Books is limited to direct relationships when the mar- 
ginal costs of ,bilateral information transfer are low, or perhaps to 
cases of private consequential economic losses of a kind that large 
numbers of consumers are apt to value highly, the decision may in 
fact be justified. In a sense, economic risks will be shifted as a result 
of reliance in precisely the same fashion as risk shifting under the 
implied warranty provisions of sales legislation. The limiting prin- 
ciple of directness ensures that the marginal costs of private re- 
allocation of such risks will be minimized. Unless these limiting prin- 
ciples are respected, the socialization of risks with its attendant 
administrative costs, subsidization and welfare losses will have 
reached its ultimate stage.135 A riskless society is simply not possible. 
133 Supra, note I, per Lord Fraser, at 482. The same point was made in Hedley 
Byrne d Co. v. Heller and Partners, supra, note 24, per Lord Devlin who 
described the tort action as associated with relationships equivalent to con- 
tract at A.C. 525-30. 
134 AS well, information disclosure will reduce the search costs of the buyer. 
See supra, note I 19: D. N. Dewees, G. F. Mathewson, M. J. Trebilcock, at 
27-31 ; R. Hirshhorn, supra, note 98, at 57-60, 62-63; R. Hirshhorn, supra, 
note 130, at 19-20. 
135 It may be that the decision is a reflection of a growing tendency to dispense 
with evidence of formal exchange transactions and voluntary express risk 
assumption and to recognize a legal duty not to disappoint the reasonable 
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The risks will be borne by finns (and thus by entrepreneurs, in- 
vestors, employees, creditom, and consumers) rather than by indi- 
viduals and that in itself will not necessarily improve the welfare of 
society. 
reliance of others. See supra, note 36, at 242. For a decidedly negative 
judicial commentary on this development, see Taylor J. in Soursos and 
Soursos v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, supra, note I ,  at 724. 
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